Catching up on directors’ conflicts of interest

Directors’ conflicts of interest are one of the favorite topics of this blog.  Among our prior posts on this subject are this one on what to cover when training directors on COIs ,  this one on corporate charitable giving,  this one on board COIs in internal investigations and this one on COIs in connection with service on the board of a joint venture.  We’ve also addressed the need for directors to monitor the COIs of senior executives in their companies – and the dire consequences that can arise from a failure to do so.

So, what’s new in the area?

First, this recent story from Bloomberg news  reported on possible conflicts involving a prominent university’s board: “13.5 percent of Dartmouth’s $3.5 billion endowment is managed by firms that are related to trustees or investment committee members.” Dartmouth is not alone in this respect, but some schools do ban the practice, based on COI concerns: “Trustees shouldn’t manage university money because of the potential for self-dealing and other abuses, says Mark Williams, a former Federal Reserve bank examiner who teaches risk management at Boston University.  ‘Even the appearance of conflicts of interest can create reputational risk and harm the institution,’ Williams says. ‘The perception is almost as bad as the act of conflict. It does damage to that reputation, which has taken many universities centuries to create.’”

On the other side of the coin, the alumni in question have apparently been very generous in their gifts to the school, so it is arguable that on a net basis the practice is worthwhile – although balancing tangible gains against possible intangible losses is hardly an easy calculus to undertake in any meaningful way.  The piece also noted: “The potential conflicts can be thrown into high relief when funds lose money. As chairman of Yeshiva University’s investment committee, J. Ezra Merkin funneled the school’s money via his hedge funds to con man Bernard Madoff in return for fees. The $1.1 billion endowment lost $14.5 million when Madoff’s Ponzi scheme blew up in 2008.”

I don’t know what to add to this except the general comment that many non-profit organizations (i.e., not just universities) could use more rigor in their approaches to COIs. Here is a piece that speaks to that.

Second, this recent post, by Klaus J. Hopt, a professor and director (emeritus) at the Max-Planck-Institute for Comparative and International Private Law, in Hamburg,  on the Harvard Law School Forum for Corporate Governance makes an interesting comparison between the duty of loyalty owed by directors under US and UK law and the prevailing approach under the continental system:  “The duty of loyalty is highly developed in Anglo-American countries, but it has received more hesitant attention in continental European countries.” However, the piece notes: “More recently there are tendencies to more convergence [and] more attention is paid to prevention, remedies and enforcement.”

At the risk of sounding US centric (whereas I’m really just COI-centric), this does sound like a positive development.  Moreover, and beyond the scope of Professor Hopt’s paper (which can be downloaded via the Harvard site), it is interesting to consider that under Delaware law (in particular the Stone v Ritter case) a board’s compliance and ethics oversight duties are  actually based on the duty of loyalty – and perhaps the convergence will extend in that direction, as well.

Leave a comment
*
**

*



* Required , ** will not be published.

*
= 5 + 9