Our fiduciary future?

There is, of course, no one body of law governing all conflict-of-interest issues. But the law regarding fiduciary duty comes closer to doing so than does any other body of law.

In “The Rise of Fiduciary Law,” recently posted on the Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, Professor Tamar Frankel of Boston University School of Law notes: Fiduciary rules appear in family law, surrogate decision-making, laws of agency, employment, pensions, remedies, banking, financial institutions, corporations, charities, not for profit organizations, medical services and international law. Fiduciary concepts guide areas of knowledge: economics, psychology; moral norms; and pluralism. Fiduciary law was recognized in Roman law and the British common law. It was embedded decades ago in religious Jewish, Christian, and Islamic laws. Internationally, fiduciary law appears in European, Chinese, Japanese and Indian laws.

Frankel traces the growth of fiduciary expectations to the increasing need in modern societies to share expertise while minimizing the risks that can arise from such sharing. Power can be used to benefit or harm. The recipients’ inability to check the experts’ power and services quality can result in suspicion and withdrawal from the expert. This result conflicts with society’s interests. After all, the financial, health, legal and education systems, to name a few, are built on offer and exchange of expertise. In response, fiduciary law establishes duty of care ensuring expert services and duty of loyalty prohibiting conflicting interests which undermine trust. Fiduciary law can entice and protect those who need expert services to rely and trust their experts. The lower the ability to check the experts’ expertise and honesty, the higher the fiduciary duty of experts and their punishment for abuse will be.

Looking forward, Frankel notes: The impact of fiduciary law is likely to rise. Fiduciary law issues are expanding. Inequality of knowledge and expertise exist and is likely to continue, depending on the degree to which those who rely on the experts can trust the experts, and the degree to which society benefits from this degree of trusting by expanding and exchanging knowledge and helpful services to its members….Regardless of whether they are enforced by law, by social rules, or by cultural pressures, fiduciary rules are a condition to the long-term well-being of a human society.

(For an earlier post on the many harms that can come from a COI-based lack of trust click here.)

For legislators, enforcement personnel and business leaders the lesson of this analysis is clear: fiduciary standards should be strongly defined and enforced. But what is the take-away for the fiduciaries themselves?

Frankel notes, in this regard: Fiduciary law should be based on one guiding test by a party that offers trusted fiduciary expert: “Would I, the trusted person, like to be treated the way I treat those who trust me?

I understand and partly agree with this proposal, but also worry – based on behavioral ethics research showing that people often underestimate the impact on them of others’ wrongdoing – that it might not produce the desired result enough of the time.  So, my friendly amendment is to put this suggested question into a third-party framework: Would the proposed action if taken by people generally tend to reduce trust generally in the context at issue?  (E.g., would non-disclosure of a payment by a pharmaceutical manufacturer to a doctor tend to reduce  the  trust of patients in their doctors generally.)

Just to be clear, I am not advocating a rewrite of the Golden Rule. I  am just suggesting that it can be easier to recognize vulnerabilities in others – i.e., people generally – than in ourselves, and this might be relevant to designing a guiding principle for fiduciaries.

 

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